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Abstract
This paper outlines a project evaluation model for examining escalation and de-escalation of commitment to infor-
mation systems projects. We view escalation and de-escalation of commitment as processes involving recurring
instances of approach-avoidance conﬂict. In the model, the sequential mapping of project events is integrated with a
model of approach-avoidance conﬂict that identiﬁes periods of gradual evolution at two separate levels of social anal-
ysis (project and work) that are punctuated by sudden, revolutionary periods of rapid change. By conceiving the pro-
cesses of commitment escalation and de-escalation as sequences of events involving approach-avoidance conﬂicts,
researchers may develop a deeper understanding of how and why projects escalate and de-escalate. Practitioners can
also utilize the evaluation model in the analyses of projects that have faced escalation to diagnose the issues surrounding
the escalation and devise useful de-escalation strategies for future project development. The evaluation model is devel-
oped and illustrated with a case study that exhibits both project escalation and de-escalation conditions.
 2005 Published by Elsevier B.V.
Keywords: Escalation and de-escalation of commitment to information system projects; Project evaluation model; Approach-avoid-
ance theory; Case study
1. Introduction
Most research on information systems (IS)
development has sought to understand why com-
mitment to projects escalates (e.g., Keil, 1995)
and how to reduce commitment to troubled
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projects (e.g., Montealegre and Keil, 2000). De-
spite this progress, escalation still occurs with high
frequency among IS projects (Pan et al., in press).
Speciﬁcally, there are two main problems contrib-
uting to this alarming regularity: the inadequacies
of project evaluations (Kumar, 1990; Pan, 2004)
and the utilization of over-deﬁnitive escalation
explanatory models (e.g., Staw and Ross, 1987).1
The IS evaluation literature has suggested several
advantages of project evaluations. For instance,
Abdel-Hamid andMadnick (1990) suggest that pro-
ject reviews may result in beneﬁcial outcomes, such
as learning from software development failures in
order to improve subsequent system development
practice. Irani (2002, p. 21) highlights the ‘‘impor-
tance of increasing the focus and depth of evalua-
tion analysis, which in turn supports increased
manageability and project success.’’ Serafeimidis
and Smithson (2003) claim that a comprehensive
evaluation process would be value adding, supports
organizational learning and a deeper understand-
ing of the IS infrastructure. Despite the perceived
importance of and the need for project evaluations,
such reviews are often performed inadequately (Pan
and Flynn, 2003; Pan, 2004). For example, Pan and
Flynn (2003) argue that organisations fail to learn
eﬀective means for solving problems apparent in
IS projects, due to attribution errors committed
during project reviews. Furthermore, Pan (2004)
also highlights a need for an integrated project esca-
lation and de-escalation evaluation model.2
One reason that may also explain the alarming
situation could be the over-reliance of a theoretical
and simplistic staged models in past escalation and
de-escalation research (Royer, 2002; Staw and
Ross, 1987) which oﬀer limited views on why
and how escalation and de-escalation occur during
project development. Staged models have been
criticized as mechanistic and unrealistic in todays
fast moving and turbulent organizational environ-
ments (Stubbart and Smalley, 1999).
For that reason, we aim to approach escalation
and de-escalation of commitment from a new an-
gle—that of treating project development processes
as a series of sequential events involving approach-
avoidance conﬂicts. Our approach is in line with
the suggestion of Keil et al. (2000) that escalation
situations in IS can be viewed as instances of ap-
proach-avoidance conﬂict. From the approach-
avoidance perspective, escalation of commitment
is viewed as a behavior that results when motivat-
ing forces that encourage persistence outweigh
defensive forces that encourage abandonment
(Brockner and Rubin, 1985), despite unambiguous
negative feedback. Similarly, these conﬂicts
could also exist in project redirections, since persis-
tence is an essential condition for successful
turnarounds.
The goal of this paper is to formulate a project
evaluation model that can be used to examine esca-
lation and de-escalation of commitment to IS pro-
jects. We propose a process model that draws
upon punctuated equilibrium theory (Gersick,
1991) which views the IS development process as
a sequence of stable and evolutionary periods
(equilibria) that are punctuated by critical and rev-
olutionary events (disequilibria). Here, a state of
equilibrium indicates that the project group has
agreed on project leadership responsibilities and
targets such as budget, manpower level and project
completion date. Project development will con-
tinue as it does unless pushed to change by some
unexpected event (such as a major environmental
change), or intentionally changed to address a
new need in the project. We further propose two
separate levels of social analysis—the project level
and the work level—for better explanatory power
(Lyytinen and Newman, submitted for publica-
tion). In this paper, we approach de-escalation
1 Staw and Rosss (1987) escalation prototype has been
criticised for its two shortcomings. First, ‘‘although the
prototype indicates what categories are at play during each
phase, it does not give much explanation about why these
categories change about time, with some new ones appearing
and other ones disappearing’’ (Royer, 2002, p. 1). Second, it
does not constitute a process theory, as the sequential order of
factors adds relatively little to our understanding of escalation
processes (Ma¨hring and Keil, 2003).
2 Pan (2004) highlights the lack of an integrated project
escalation and de-escalation evaluation model in the IS devel-
opment literature. Existing project escalation and de-escalation
models examined their respective phenomenon separately (e.g.,
Keil, 1995; Montealegre and Keil, 2000). By dissecting the two
phenomena, some of the detailed contents containing the
information regarding the transition from escalation to de-
escalation may be inadequately captured by the researcher
(Pan, 2004).
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with our focus on project redirection rather than
abandonment since successful project turnarounds
are rarely documented and discussed in the IS lit-
erature. Accordingly, we undertake a case study
where we evaluate the development process of an
IS project that initially went out of control (cycles
of escalation) but which was successfully turned
around (de-escalation). In the subsequent sections,
we will introduce our proposed model and demon-
strate how it could enrich the current understand-
ing of escalation and de-escalation of commitment
to IS projects during project reviews.
2. Past research
Escalation of commitment is a phenomenon
that refers to situations where decision makers
commit additional resources to a failing course
of action (Staw, 1981). Early escalation studies
suggested that the escalation phenomenon repre-
sents a syndrome of decision errors, which tends
to lock decision makers into a course of action
(Staw, 1981). However, an alternative deﬁnition
was later proposed by Bowen (1987) which sug-
gests that escalation of commitment can also result
from a dilemma caused by the interplay between
the degree of commitment to a course of action
and the amount of equivocality perceived in the
feedback on prior investments and in expectations
for the future. Escalation studies have been ap-
plied to a variety of settings. In IS projects, com-
mitment escalation is a widely observed
phenomenon, such as in the well-known Taurus
project at the London Stock Exchange (Drum-
mond, 1996), and the case of the baggage handling
system at the Denver International Airport (Mont-
ealegre and Keil, 2000). The escalation literature
has suggested four types of determinants of com-
mitment, namely project, psychological, social
and structural, that together can explain the
escalation phenomenon in IS settings (Staw and
Ross, 1987; Keil, 1995). To alleviate the impact
of project escalation, Keil and Robey (1999) have
suggested a de-escalation strategy as an eﬀective
way of reducing commitment to a troubled
project.
De-escalation of commitment is deﬁned as the
‘‘reversal of escalating commitments to failing
courses of action, either through project termina-
tion or redirection’’ (Keil and Robey, 1999, p.
65). To date, the IS development literature has
suggested a stage-based process model of de-esca-
lation (Montealegre and Keil, 2000). While
Montealegre and Keils (2000) four-phase de-
escalation model ﬁts well with large-scaled IS
project context and has provided useful insights
on the de-escalation process, Pan (2004) suggests
that an alternative explanatory model may be
necessary to explain the de-escalation process in
other types of IS projects. This is important espe-
cially in todays multi-dimensional and complex
project environments as one may have to recog-
nize the importance of contextual diﬀerences in
determining the appropriateness of a particular
model.
Several theories have been used to explain the
escalation phenomenon, such as self-justiﬁcation
theory (Staw, 1981), prospect theory (Whyte,
1986), agency theory (Jensen and Meckling,
1976) and approach-avoidance theory (Rubin
and Brockner, 1975). Among these theories, the
approach-avoidance theory appears to provide a
more complete explanation of the escalation and
de-escalation phenomena for two main reasons.
First, it captures the essence of complex situations
that tend to create conﬂict in the mind of a deci-
sion maker who faces a project with an ambiguous
future (i.e., a decision maker who needs to decide
whether to persist with or abandon the project).
Second, the approach-avoidance perspective acts
as a foundation to bring several diﬀerent escala-
tion theories into one over-arching model (Mann,
2003). This is possible as many of the drivers
(which may alternatively be known as aspects or
attributes) that encourage and discourage persis-
tence in the approach-avoidance perspective could
also be used to explain escalation theories. In an
approach-avoidance conﬂict, there are aspects that
attract and attributes that repel. This creates con-
ﬂict. The decision maker has to weigh the positive
and negative attributes in order to decide which is
stronger—the need to approach or the need to
avoid (Rubin and Brockner, 1975). Table 1 summa-
rizes the attributes that encourage and discourage
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persistence. Intriguingly, the drivers to persist out-
weigh those to desist.
The IS evaluation literature lists a variety of
beneﬁts for evaluating information systems (e.g.
Farbey et al., 1999; Irani and Love, 2001) which
include beneﬁts such as ensured compliance with
user objectives, improvements in the eﬀectiveness
and productivity of the design, and realization of
cost savings, by modifying systems through evalu-
ation, before, rather than after, a real operation.
Birk et al. (2002) also suggest that project evalua-
tion is the best way to eradicate IS project failure.
Despite their potentials, IS project evaluations are
seldom performed adequately (Pan and Flynn,
2003; Pan, 2004). For instance, Kumar (1990) sug-
gests that project reviews are being performed for
the limited, short-term reason of formalizing the
end of the development project and may not pro-
vide the more important long-term, feedback-
improvement beneﬁts of the evaluation process.
Pan and Flynn (2003) question the eﬀectiveness
of these project evaluations by putting forward
the concept of project groups committing attribu-
tion errors. Overall, the review of the IS evaluation
literature reveals the signiﬁcance of project evalua-
tions and identiﬁed a knowledge gap which indi-
cates a strong desire for an evaluation model of
escalation and de-escalation of commitment to IS
projects.
3. An evaluation model of escalation and
de-escalation of commitment to IS projects
In this study, we specify an evaluation model of
escalation and de-escalation of commitment to IS
projects. We propose the use of a punctuated equi-
librium model over a staged-based model to aid
the empirical detection of repeated patterns of so-
cial activity and their complex social history (e.g.,
Newman and Robey, 1992) and better reﬂect to-
days uncertain and rapidly changing project envi-
ronments. In this model, we view events as
instances of social action relating to the IS devel-
opment process (Hirschheim et al., 1991). Our
interest lies in explaining the source and conse-
quences of these events, which follow a path
dependency principle.3 Therefore, we need to rec-
Table 1
A summary of approach-avoidance attributes that encourage and discourage persistence in project development (adapted from Mann,
2003)
Driver to persist
Cost of withdrawal
– The decision maker will be considered a failure by others (Rubin et al., 1980)
– Sunk cost eﬀect (Keil et al., 2000)
Reward for success
– To be viewed as successful and perhaps to gain status or even promotion (Rubin and Brockner, 1975)
– The organization will reap the beneﬁts of the project that have been envisioned at the outset. (Brockner et al., 1979)
Proximity to goal
– Completion eﬀect (Conlon and Garland, 1993)
Ambiguity
– The conﬁdence that the project could be turned around (Rubin and Brockner, 1975)
– The visibility of project completion (Conlon and Garland, 1993)
Driver to desist
Cost of persistence
– Opportunity cost incurred for investing in a project turnaround rather than a new project (Northcraft and Neale, 1986)
3 The concept is illustrated in Lyytinen and Newman (sub-
mitted for publication, p. 1) as they portrayed ‘‘information
system evolution as episodes punctuated by critical incidents
thus creating a new state (episode) leading to speciﬁc evolu-
tionary traces in system history’’.
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ognize necessary antecedent conditions for any
event to take place by observing the system state
(and history) at that stage and possible internal
or external changes that create the event (Petti-
grew, 1987, 1990). Thus, IS development is por-
trayed as a sequence of events that unfolds over
time. A series of negative project information that
is not heeded by the project manager would satisfy
the requirement of project escalation (Keil, 1995).
Project redirection is triggered by a critical event
when a project shifts from escalation to either an
ambiguous or positive state. When a project
stops after a period of escalation, it may represent
project abandonment.
In a research setting, the researcher has to de-
cide what to classify as events and which events
to consider as critical. In this paper, we assume
that organizations are complex entities, comprised
of many goal-directed individuals whose purposes
may be incompatible. Therefore, we analyze
sequences of events at two separate social
levels—the project level and the work level—to of-
fer greater explanatory power and also to reconcile
any contradictions in the processes (Cule and
Robey, 2004). Project level events are described
as incidents occurring in the project that inﬂuence
the proceeding or outcome of the project. Work
level events are characterized as incidents occur-
ring in the work systems that inﬂuence the
progress of the project. For example, a user
manager leaving the project group during the
project development process to take up a new
assignment unrelated to the IS project could aﬀect
the development process. Basically, the project
emerges within the organization and develops its
own boundaries that give the project its identity
that diﬀers with the identity of the organization
(Lyytinen and Newman, submitted for publica-
tion). In this model, we argue that two sets of pro-
ject and organizational work identities exist and
are expected to interact in parallel. Both project
and work level events unfold simultaneously with-
in an organization and their necessary intersec-
tions may alter a projects evolutionary path.
Antecedent (historical) conditions may also aﬀect
subsequent events in project development. Every
project event is continuously inﬂuenced by its envi-
ronment. The model also suggests that at every
critical event (an incident that changes the
projects trajectory), the project manager may have
to weigh the positive and negative attributes in
order to persist or desist project development
(Mann, 2003). The researcher may need to use
his or her judgment to determine the net force
(whether positive force or negative force is stron-
ger) that seems to best ﬁt the information
Project Level Positive t
(Events) 
   Ambiguous 
   Negative 
Work Level 
(Events)    ………………           ..……….           ……………                ........... 
 Approach  
Attributes (+) 
Avoidance 
Attributes (-) 
 
Net Forces 
Context (Organization and Beyond) 
O
U
T
C
O
M
E
S
Fig. 1. An evaluation model of commitment escalation and de-escalation in IS projects.
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presented. Fig. 1 shows the general structure of the
model.
4. Research approach
Our strategy was to undertake an in-depth
interpretive case study (Klein and Myers, 1999)
of an electronic procurement (e-procurement) pro-
ject conducted in UKC (a pseudonym). The re-
search site is a large metropolitan borough
council located in the United Kingdom (UK).
The case study approach is adopted as it allows
for the better capturing of the organizational
dynamics of a phenomenon (Newman and Sabher-
wal, 1996). We have selected the particular case for
study as the project escalation and turnaround
experiences it exhibits oﬀer a valuable example of
the escalation and de-escalation phenomena,
which may prove useful when devising de-escala-
tion strategies and tactics.
We negotiated research access with UKC in
December 2001. From January 2002 to August
2002, we carried out data collection, which began
in the ﬁeld with a meeting with the IS Strategic
Director, who provided additional documentation
(internal project management records) outlining
the project management history in UKC. Primar-
ily, semi-structured interviews and informal dis-
cussions were conducted with all relevant project
stakeholders. The relevant stakeholders were the
Council Cabinet representative, the Strategic
Management Director, the head of IS services,
and the project development team that consisted
of the IS Project Manager, an IS analyst, users
representing several business functions and the
IS contractor. Twenty-eight interviews were con-
ducted, each lasting an average of one and a half
hours involving altogether 17 interviewees. Details
such as the dates of the interviews, the intervie-
wees job titles, the duration of the interviews,
and whether a transcript was produced are shown
in Appendix A. Secondary data such as reports,
memorandums, and meeting minutes were also
gathered to supplement the information collected
through interviews. We established a set of topic
guides to help us with the interview questions
(e.g., ‘‘Discuss various critical incidents that have
aﬀected the progress of the project’’; ‘‘Identify
the de-escalation triggering activities’’). Materials
drawn from the escalation and approach-avoid-
ance theory literature guided the design of the
questions. Most interviews were taped-recorded
and transcribed with interviewees permission.
We took notes for four interviewees who refused
permission for the use of a tape recorder. In our
attempt to motivate the interviewees to speak
openly about their experiences in the project, we
tried to reduce their suspicion and uneasiness by
explaining our research objectives and the signiﬁ-
cance of our study clearly, which was to help im-
prove future project management performances
within the council. In addition, we conducted all
our interviews on a one-to-one basis and assured
them that all interview conversations would be
kept conﬁdential, even from their colleagues. In-
ter-subject reliability was increased by using the
narratives from one subject to conﬁrm or contra-
dict others in a social triangulation (Miles and
Huberman, 1994). But there was no attempt to
privilege one account over another. The research-
ers judged that there was no overt attempt by sub-
jects to systematically conceal details or to distort
their stories.
As a ﬁrst step in the data analysis, the ﬁrst
author analyzed the antecedent conditions, inter-
view transcripts and secondary data, and created
a detailed history of the project in narrative form.
Next, he identiﬁed the events that unfolded over
time. These events were analyzed at both the pro-
ject and work levels. The alternating slow and ra-
pid paces of change seemed to best conform to a
punctuated equilibrium model (Newman and Ro-
bey, 1992). After validating the events with several
individuals who were familiar with the projects
history, the researcher rated the events as positive,
ambiguous, or negative. To reduce researcher bias,
the project information and interview transcripts
were shown to a co-researcher who was unin-
volved in the ﬁeldwork. The role of this co-
researcher was to ‘‘bring a diﬀerent and possibly
more objective eye to the evidence’’ (Eisenhardt,
1989, p. 538). The information he received did
not include the ﬁrst authors list of events and rat-
ings. Next, the co-researcher developed his own list
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of events and ratings. After that, both researchers
met to compare their individual lists of events. In
cases where it was diﬃcult to categorize an event4
or agree on a rating, two steps were taken. First,
the two researchers used their own judgment to as-
sign the ratings that seemed to best ﬁt the informa-
tion presented. Second, the other authors of the
paper went through the list and discussed among
themselves how the events ought to be rated. A ﬁ-
nal decision was made after an agreement by all
the authors of the paper. After the events were
rated, the entire project development process was
presented in the form of the evaluation model as
shown in Fig. 1.
The next step of the analysis was to determine
the approach and avoidance attributes at several
critical events in the development process. The
evaluation model was used as the basis for identi-
fying and organizing the attributes. The ﬁrst
author compared the forces promoting approach
and avoidance, and determined which was greater,
hence explaining the various evolutionary and rev-
olutionary periods. These approach-avoidance
attributes were compared and contrasted against
the array of factors identiﬁed in the IS develop-
ment literature as contributory to escalation or
de-escalation. The entire data analysis process
went through numerous iterations (Klein and
Myers, 1999) before an overview of the case orga-
nization could be formulated.
5. The e-procurement system at UKC
This section presents background information
about UKC and its e-procurement project. UKC
is a UK municipal borough with an elected council
that serves a local population of 221,000 and
provides a wide range of services. The antecedent
conditions suggest that the idea of electronic gov-
ernment (e-government) originates from the cen-
tral governments 1999 White Paper, Modernizing
Government, which challenged all public sector
organizations to achieve ‘‘citizen-centered ser-
vices’’ by integrating policies and programs, join-
ing-up delivery, harnessing the power of IS, and
getting the best out of staﬀ. The White Paper com-
mitted the government to the ‘‘use of new technol-
ogy to meet the needs of citizens and business and
not trail behind technology development’’. The
overall champion for the e-government initiative
was the cabinet deputy of the council, who was as-
signed a special post known as the E-Envoy. The
main purpose of this post was to propel the e-gov-
ernment initiative within UKC.
The case highlights the escalation process and
identiﬁes critical events that punctuated the de-
escalation process. The case facts are presented
in a series of events that illustrate both the escala-
tion and de-escalation processes (shown in Appen-
dix A: Tables 2 and 3). Table 2 also provides
information about the project timeline, and its
accumulated investment. Approach and avoidance
attributes and their net forces that determine the
project trajectory are summarized in Table 4
(Appendix A). Detailed contents of the E-Envoys
role, challenges encountered and major decisions
made during the project are summarized in a table
in Appendix A. Finally, the project evalua-
tion model of commitment escalation and de-esca-
lation to the e-procurement project at UKC is
shown in Fig. 2. Fig. 2 also identiﬁes a period of
escalation (Events 2–4) punctuated by two de-esca-
lation attempts (Events 5 and 7). Fig. 2 further
indicates that the de-escalation process does not
necessarily move forward to a desired end goal. In-
stead, there may be twists and turns (Drummond,
1998) during the de-escalation process (e.g., Event
10).
6. Discussion
We have demonstrated the use of a project eval-
uation model to examine the escalation and de-
escalation process at UKC (shown in Fig. 2). We
4 An example was that we had diﬀerent interpretations on
users request to abandon the software development and accept
a packaged software during the later stages of the project
development. While it may be viewed as a negative event due to
reducing commitment to the project, it may also be considered
as a positive de-escalation triggering activity.
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Table 2
A summary of project events illustrating the e-procurement project development at UKC
Determinants of
commitment
Event 1: proposal to develop the new system (positive) Event 2: requirement problems (negative)
Project-related
factor
The e-procurement system was proposed due to reasons which included
improving purchasing eﬃciency, setting up a cost control mechanism,
and a strong desire to be the ﬁrst local council in the UK to purchase
goods and services electronically
The council head gave full support for the project and the 12-month
project was launched in January 2001 with an initial estimated cost of
£150,000. The project was headed by the IS Manager, who was
supervised by an e-procurement committee formed by a group of senior
directors within the council
An external software vendor, selected through a bidding system, was
tasked with developing the software. Other key stakeholders included the
internal users of the system, such as the Chief Procurement Oﬃcer, the
Corporate Service Manager, the Corporate Aﬀairs Manager, the Technical
Service Manager and the E-Business Manager. External users included
goods and services suppliers
The project faced several problems during its early stages
of development. The main problem concerned conﬂicts
among the IS Project Manager, the users and the IS
contractor over design issues. On the one hand, internal
users complained about the low quality of the software
and the failure of the contractor to understand their
requirements
‘‘The new version was even worse than the earlier one.
They did not seem to understand what we really
wanted.’’ (Corporate Service Manager, 15 March 2002,
#UKC-8)
On the other hand, the IS Project Manager and the IS
contractor were dissatisﬁed with the indecisiveness of the
users and pinpointed their frequent requests for design
change as the main reason for the delay in project
development
‘‘In my view, these changes were not so critical.’’
(IS Project Manager, 20 January 2002, #UKC-3)
Psychological factor
Social factor
Structural factor
Timeline January 2001 March 2001
Acc. cost Budget: £150,000 £150,000
Determinants of
commitment
Event 3: dispute over design changes (negative) Event 4: request to renegotiate the contract (negative)
Project-related factor Despite several meetings and discussions, the problem remained. In fact, the
situation worsened when the volume of change intensiﬁed and became
increasingly unmanageable.
The users number of requests doubled from 25 to almost 50 per design
meeting.’’ (IS analyst, 7 February 2002, #UKC-4)
The project initially stalled due to a disagreement
between the users and the IS contractor. It started
when the IS contractor demanded an additional
£150,000 for redesigning the software again.
Their reason was that since the contract price was
predetermined, any changes to the software after the
users had signed oﬀ a version of the prototype were
chargeable. However, the users disagreed with the claim
because they viewed those changes as alterations
necessitated by the contractors mistakes, rather than
additions that they were requesting
‘‘They did not follow our initial requests and they were
charging us for the mistakes they made?’’ (Chief
Procurement Oﬃcer, 2 March 2002, #UKC-7)
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Psychological factor
Social factor
Structural factor
Timeline May 2001 July 2001
Acc. cost £150,000 £150,000
Determinants of
commitment
Event 5: intervention by e-procurement committee (positive) Event 6: disagreement over project direction among
stakeholders (negative)
Project-related factor Eventually, the e-procurement steering committee intervened
and agreed to make the additional payment
After the committees intervention, the project managed to
continue for another two months before it ﬁnally collapsed.
The same problems resurfaced and the users refused to
continue participation in project development. Instead,
they proposed the purchase of an e-procurement module
which would be added to the existing ﬁnancial system.
At the same time, the IS Project Manager seemed to have
lost control of the project and was busy haggling with the
IS contractor over the issue of what requests were
categorized as additions or alterations. Despite this dire
situation, the e-procurement committee did not intervene
directly, except to insist to the users that the project had
to continue. However, they did promise another £100,000.
While the users were resolute about project abandonment,
the IS Project Manager however, insisted that they should
continue
‘‘How could we give up? With all the resources invested,
the option of reverting to buying packaged software was
unimaginable.’’ (IS Project Manager, 4 July 2002,
#UKC-13)
Psychological factor ‘‘The project was his baby. He would never give it up.’’
(Technical Manager, 14 July 2002, #UKC-16)
Social factor ‘‘What were we going to tell everybody if the project did not succeed?
The stakes were very high and we could not disappoint them.’’
(IS Strategic Director, 15 January 2002, #UKC-2)
Structural factor ‘‘We had to continue. We had to answer to our cabinet deputy.’’
(Corporate Service Director, 4 August 2002, #UKC-23)
Timeline August 2001 November 2001
Acc. cost £300,000 £400,000
(continued on next page)
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Table 2 (continued)
Determinants of
commitment
Event 7: whistle-blowing on the troubled
project (ambiguous)
Event 8: aﬃrmation of continued commitment
(positive)
Event 9: clarifying the magnitude of
the problem (positive)
Project-related
factor
Refusing to continue with the troubled
project, one of the users decided to blow
the whistle on the project by reporting
to the E-Envoy
To resolve the problems, the E-Envoy gathered all
internal and external stakeholders, including
representatives from the IS contractor and goods
and services suppliers, to reaﬃrm his commitment
to the project. He stated a strong desire for the
project to be continued rather than abandoned
The E-Envoy organized a focus
group meeting to re-examine
previous problems. With the
E-Envoys presence and
participation, everyone showed
great enthusiasm in the meeting.
Psychological
factor
‘‘I believed the involvement of the E-Envoy would
resolve the entanglement. The committee and the
Project Manager were too optimistic and irrational,
from my perspective.’’ (Corporate Service Manager,
4 August 2002, #UKC-22)
‘‘I simply assured them
that no individuals would
be punished in this project.
I also stressed that we had
to succeed at whatever
cost.’’ (E-Envoy, 30
July 2002, #UKC-20)
Social factor ‘‘It was important for everyone to understand my
standpoint, especially in that state of confusion.
Besides, the project was highly critical to us. It was
the next-generation way of running a local council.
Furthermore, the central government expected us to
be a role model in the e-procurement initiative in
the UK.’’ (E-Envoy, 30 July 2002, #UKC-20)
Structural
factor
The E-Envoy was informed and was surprised
at the problems facing the project. He explained
why the news came as a surprise to him
‘‘At the bi-monthly management meetings over
the past few months, the committee members did
not inform me of any critical problem arising.
We were so close. It was too late to give up.’’
(E-Envoy, 30 July 2002, #UKC-20)
Immediately, he halted project development
indeﬁnitely until a decision was made
Timeline December 2001 January 2002 February 2002
Acc. cost £400,000 £400,000 £400,000
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Determinants of
commitment
Event 10: project members lacking conﬁdence in project turnaround
(ambiguous)
Event 11: identifying & legitimizing the partial
abandonment strategy (positive)
Project-related factor Having identiﬁed the problems, the whole team started to
explore alternative courses of action. The team proposed
the adoption of a partial abandonment strategy, which was
to reduce the original scope of the project without causing
signiﬁcant changes to its original speciﬁcation
Psychological factor The assurance from the E-Envoy was well received by everyone present in
that meeting as they began to discuss their diﬀerences openly. They were
unafraid of highlighting their mistakes. In that meeting, several problems
were identiﬁed. The IS Project Manager explained the change of attitude,
‘‘Basically, he [the E-Envoy] banged all our heads together. All he wanted
was to try and get the cohesion of the team back. We promised him that
we would get together and work out our diﬀerences.’’ (IS Project Manager,
4 July 2002, #UKC-13)
Despite the change in attitude, the IS Project Manager conceded that it
was a very diﬃcult phase
‘‘It took several of us quite a while to restore conﬁdence that a turnaround
was indeed possible.’’ (IS Project Manager, 4 July 2002, #UKC-13)
‘‘Even though a lot of us appeared co-operative, I knew we were all
lacking faith that the second time might work out.’’ (Chief Procurement
Oﬃcer, 28 August 2002, #UKC-18)
‘‘With only three departments and the project divided
into many stages, all of us felt conﬁdent that the ﬁrst
stage was within our reach.’’ (IS Project Manager,
4 July 2002, #UKC-13)
Social factor
Structural factor For that reason, three user departments were short-
listed as pilot sites, hence allowing the IS Project
Manager to deal with the needs of only three user
departments rather than eight departments as before.
Furthermore, the project was divided into three
stages. Instead of implementing full-scale
procurement functions all at once, the ﬁrst stage
would now focus on the front purchasing process
which included only ordering, purchase orders
issuance and items delivery
‘‘Reducing the scope certainly enhanced our chances
of success.’’ (E-Envoy, 30 July 2002, #UKC-20)
Timeline April 2002 June 2002
Acc. cost £400,000 £400,000
(continued on next page)
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Table 2 (continued)
Determinants of
commitment
Event 12: stakeholders bought in (positive) Outcome: troubled project successfully turned around
(positive)
Project-related factor All the changes were implemented immediately
and they produced remarkable results.
When the ﬁrst phase of the e-procurement system
ﬁnally went live, the project was eight months
behind schedule and close to £300,000 over its
original budget. The relatively smooth
implementation after the adoption of
the de-escalation strategy meant that the crisis
concerning the project was ﬁnally over.
One of the user managers commented:
‘‘With fewer users, things seemed to progress
smoothly and quickly. I would think that everyone
of us was determined to make it work. Even the
contractor came to meetings two or three times a
week. The new team seemed to show more
enthusiasm and commitment. In addition, the
committees close monitoring kept all of us on
our toes.’’ (Chief Procurement Oﬃcer, 28 August
2002, #UKC-18)
Psychological factor ‘‘We simply made sure that everyone felt comfortable with the exit strategy.
We also encouraged project members to discuss among themselves to see if
the exit strategy was the best available option.’’ (IS Strategic Director,
29 July 2002, #UKC-19)
Social factor The E-Envoy ordered a stakeholder analysis before the rollout of the
action plan. The purpose was to ﬁnd out whether all internal and external
constituencies fully supported the devised turnaround strategies. The E-Envoy
reckoned that a new stakeholder analysis must be performed since the actors
involved in the development process could still be strongly committed to the
prior failing course of action. The e-procurement steering committee members
carried out the stakeholder analysis. For those who still had doubts, the
E-Envoy and committee members spent considerable eﬀort to convince them.
Structural factor
Timeline July 2002 August 2002
Acc. cost £400,000 £400,000
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Table 3
A summary of work-level events that intersected project-level events in the e-procurement project at UKC
Level of analysis Antecedent conditions Event 3: annual department audit (negative) Event 6: alternative e-purchasing
application (negative)
Work (events) By end 2000, there was a need to revamp
the existing purchasing function in order
to meet the target set within the
e-government strategy plan that 100% of
the goods purchased by the council had
to be purchased electronically by 2005.
Besides that, there were also other
considerations for UKC to implement the
e-procurement system. These reasons
included improving purchasing eﬃciency,
setting up a cost control mechanism, and
a strong desire to be the ﬁrst local council
in the UK to purchase goods and services
electronically. The project was predicted
to save millions of pounds sterling
annually. It was planned to be ready
within a year
During the annual audit conducted in the
procurement department by an established
external auditor, it was found that there were
several deviations concerning work practices.
Several of the existing practices were
contradictory to the standard policy manual.
Due to this, the policies in the standard
manual had to be drastically modiﬁed.
The implication was that many more changes
would have to be made. As a result, the
volume of change intensiﬁed and became
increasingly unmanageable. To make
matters worse, user managers demanded to
introduce two specialists from their
departments who were more experienced
than the existing project team in daily
procurement transactions. The reason for
their addition was to assist with the new
changes
‘‘We needed to bring in people who were
familiar with the policy changes and the
daily purchasing operations.’’ (Corporate
Service Manager, 4 August 2002, #UKC-22)
While the IS Project Manager and the IS
analysts were still struggling to sort out
the problems, the Finance Manager
introduced into the project an accounting
information system vendor who was
interested in providing an e-purchasing
module to be incorporated into the
existing system used in the ﬁnance
department
The Chief Procurement Oﬃcer was
interested and made arrangements with
the software vendor to conduct a
demonstration for other user managers.
‘‘The software vendor promised that by
switching to his recommended module,
we could obtain more functions and a
higher level of performance than the one
that we were developing.’’ (Chief
Procurement Oﬃcer, 28 August 2002,
#UKC-18)
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will next discuss how the model could enrich our
present understanding of the escalation and de-
escalation of commitment to IS projects, which
could eventually help organizations to improve
their future system developments.
7. Escalation as instances of approach-avoidance
conﬂict
Our results support the view that escalation
can be viewed as instances of approach-avoidance
conﬂict (Rubin and Brockner, 1975), and that
approach-avoidance attributes operate simulta-
neously in a project. However, we also note that
some attributes may appear earlier than others
in a project. For example in the case of UKC, re-
ward for success attributes appeared in Event 1,
whereas cost of withdrawal attributes only
started appearing from Event 5. The e-procure-
ment project began to show signs of escalation
in Events 2–4, when persisting drivers such as re-
wards for success and ambiguity about the pro-
ject future overrode desisting drivers in the face
of project failure. Our results also conﬁrm the
existence of the completion eﬀect (Conlon and
Garland, 1993), which is a core component of
the approach-avoidance theory. It could be seen
in interviewees comments such as: ‘‘We were so
close, it was too late to give up now.’’ (E-Envoy,
30 July 2002, #UKC-20) (Event 7—project level);
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Fig. 2. The approach-avoidance punctuated equilibrium model of escalation and de-escalation of commitment as applied to the
e-procurement project at UKC.
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Table 4
Approach-avoidance attributes and their net forces that determined the e-procurement project trajectory at UKC
Event 1:
Positive
Events 2–4:
Negative
Event 5:
Positive
Event 6:
Negative
Event 7:
Ambiguous
Events 8–9:
Positive
Event 10:
Ambiguous
Events 11–12:
Positive
Approach
Cost of
withdrawal
– Considered a
failure by
others
– Responsible to
internal and
external
constituents
– Fear of
recrimination
– Sunk costs
– IS Project
Managers
public
identiﬁcation
with the
project
– High business
criticality
– Support and
commitment
of the top
management
in a turn-
around
– Stakeholders
bought in
for the turn-
around
Reward for
success
– Increases
purchasing
eﬃciency
– A good cost
control
mechanism
– First local
council
in the UK
to purchase
goods and
services
electronically
– Increases
purchasing
eﬃciency
– A good cost
control
mechanism
– First local
council
in the UK to
purchase goods
and services
electronically
–Viewed as successful
and may gain status
or even promotion
– Role model
in the UK
e-government
initiative
– Assurance of
no recrimination
and blame-free
– Re-establish-
ment of project
groups
credibility
– A new team
from the IS
contractor
to reestablish
credibility
and customer
relationship
– First local
council in
the UK to
purchase
goods and
services
electronically
Proximity to
goal
– Close to
completion
– Close to a
successful
turnaround
Ambiguity – Problems viewed
as temporary
– Reassessment
of problems
– Clariﬁed the
magnitude of
the problems
– E-Envoy was
conﬁdent of a
turnaround
– Reduced
project scope
and a smaller
stakeholder
group
(continued on next page)
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and ‘‘The ﬁrst stage was within our reach.’’ (IS
Project Manager, 4 July 2002, #UKC-13) (Event
11—project level). The level of persistence in-
creased as the e-procurement project inched closer
to completion. There was a false perception that
the e-procurement project was close to comple-
tion in the earlier part of project development,
and this may be attributed to a lack of informa-
tion about the actual status of the project. Indeed,
the E-Envoy was totally unaware of the problems
faced by the project group during the early stages
of its development process. Overall, the UKC
case illustrates a scenario of the project manager
being overly optimistic in his perceptions (e.g.,
Events 2–6) and the top management failing to
receive accurate status reports (cf., the so-called
mum eﬀect).5
Furthermore, the ﬁndings from the case of
UKC also suggest that the approach-avoidance
perspective could act as a foundation to bring
several diﬀerent escalation theories into one
over-arching model (Mann, 2003). For example,
approach-avoidance attributes (refer to Fig. 2)
such as considered as a failure by others (Self-
Justiﬁcation Theory), sunk cost (Prospect The-
ory) and information processing (Agency The-
ory) indicate that aspects of several theories
may be operating simultaneously within the
e-procurement project. Here, we view these esca-
lation theories as complementary rather than
competitive when used to explain escalation
behavior (Keil et al., 2000).
Finally, our analysis identiﬁes high business
criticality as an important approach attribute
that has contributed to the persistence of the e-
procurement project at UKC. Interestingly, it is
a contributing factor for both project escalation
and redirection in the case. This signiﬁes that
the project had such a signiﬁcant meaning to
the organization that it had to be turned around.
It was strategically critical to the organization, as
it possessed signiﬁcant business values in two
ways: ‘‘It was the next-generation way of run-
ning a local council. Furthermore, the central
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5 Here, we acknowledge the inﬂuence of the hindsight eﬀect.
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government expected us to be a role model in the
e-procurement initiative in the UK’’ (E-Envoy,
30 July 2002, #UKC-20) (Event 8—project le-
vel). This has not been acknowledged in both
the escalation and de-escalation literature, and
could potentially be important since high busi-
ness criticality can also be used to make sense
of why the baggage handling system at the Den-
ver International Airport was still completed de-
spite being 16 months behind schedule and close
to US$2 billion over budget: ‘‘There was a grow-
ing realization that baggage handling would be
critically important in an airport of this size
and that this issue could not be oﬀ-loaded to
the airlines that would be operating out of
DIA’’ (Montealegre and Keil, 2000, p. 418). In
other words, the importance of the problem in
our case as well as the baggage handling example
did not escalate or de-escalate: they remained
critical to the organizations and had to be
pursued.
8. De-escalation as a gradual process with twists
and turns
Our ﬁndings support the view that de-escala-
tion is a gradual process (Montealegre and Keil,
2000) rather than a sudden event that occurs al-
most instantly when certain conditions, such as
unambiguously negative feedback, are present
(e.g., Garland et al., 1990). However, we also pro-
pose that the de-escalation process may encom-
pass some twists and turns (Drummond, 1998).
This diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the prevailing argu-
ment in the IS development literature that the de-
escalation process is always forward-moving and
comprises of only four-phases (e.g., Montealegre
and Keil, 2000). The twist in the de-escalation
process at UKC (refer to Event 10—project level)
was due to project members lack of conﬁdence
that the project would be turned around, which
in turn derailed the progress of the turnaround
process. We consider this a twist from the posi-
tive to the ambiguous state before eventually
returning to the positive state (see Fig. 2). This
implies that critical events may alter the trajectory
of a project and revolutionize de-escalation
proceedings.
Fig. 2 also suggests that the project entered into
two crises during the development process (Events
2, 3, 4 and 6—project level). In both crises, dra-
matic interventions were necessary to turn the
troubled project around. However, the e-procure-
ment committee did not seize the opportunity
and failed to take any major corrective actions, ex-
cept to provide additional ﬁnancial support (refer
to Event 5—project level) for project development.
The irony is that such behavior could, in fact,
encourage persistence in a troubled project and
lead to project escalation. The E-Envoy, however,
with the help of the rest of the project group mem-
bers, identiﬁed an alternative strategy and success-
fully implemented the turnaround strategy.
Importantly, the ﬁndings suggest that triggering
activities that promote de-escalation must be avail-
able before any successful implementation of de-
escalation could take place (Keil and Robey,
1999). Four triggering activities may be identiﬁed
in the UKC case: making negative outcomes less
threatening, giving unambiguously negative feed-
back, identifying the problems and appealing to
stakeholders (Montealegre and Keil, 2000). Among
these activities, the whistle-blowing act could be
considered a major turning point in the e-procure-
ment project development at UKC. The events
that unfolded over the project development pro-
cess at UKC illustrated both the mum eﬀect and
the deaf eﬀect (Keil and Robey, 1999). The
mum eﬀect, which is the failure to transmit unam-
biguous negative feedback, could explain why the
project still progressed despite having trouble—
the decision maker was unaware of the actual sta-
tus of the project. The deaf eﬀect could be seen in
the e-procurement committee members unwilling-
ness to take corrective action even though they
were fully informed about the problems inherent
in the project development. It was clearly a situa-
tion of decision dilemmas (Bowen, 1987) that
was surrounded by several contradictory voices
from the IS project manager and the users. The
case also demonstrated how both the mum eﬀect
and the deaf eﬀect were overcome (refer to Events
7 and 8) before a project turnaround could take
place (Keil and Robey, 2001).
S.L. Pan et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 173 (2006) 1139–1160 1155
9. Necessary intersections between project and
work level events may trigger both the escalation
and de-escalation processes
Our analysis suggests that project and work
level events unfolded simultaneously and mostly
independently during the e-procurement project
development at UKC, and their necessary intersec-
tions triggered both the escalation and de-escala-
tion processes in the project. For example,
activities that occurred in the work systems (Event
6—work level) triggered the de-escalation process
in the troubled project. Basically, the alternative
e-procurement solution provided user managers
with an opportunity to re-assess their failing
course of action. Though it might have under-
mined group unity in the project, nevertheless, it
has provided an important condition that
prompted the whistle blowing (Event 7—project
level) (Keil and Robey, 2001). Similarly, the an-
nual department audit that took place in the pro-
curement department (Event 3—work level),
served as a good example of why activities in the
work systems could trigger escalation of commit-
ment to the troubled e-procurement project. As a
result, more resources had to be invested since sev-
eral new modiﬁcations had to be added to the pro-
totype and the project group had to be re-
organized. This greatly disrupted project develop-
ment, which was already facing some problems
at that stage, and further delayed the progress.
At that point, the project situation at UKC clearly
fulﬁlled the essential condition of a runaway pro-
ject (Keil and Robey, 1999).
The two examples from the case of UKC sug-
gest that the necessary intersections of work and
project level events are subtle but critical interplays
between simultaneous processes and events. By
positing that the development process should be
examined at two separate levels of social analysis
(project and work), we have introduced greater
explanatory power and reconciled the contradic-
tions in the two processes of the organization
(Cule and Robey, 2004). Overall, this demon-
strates that any process analysis has to carefully
outline an inﬂuence and its direction at various
points along the evolutionary path in order to
show how the project constitutes and inﬂuences
its context and vice versa.
10. Implications, conclusion, limitations and
future research challenges
The purpose of our paper is to outline a project
evaluation model for examining escalation and de-
escalation of commitment to information systems
projects. By drawing upon a case study of an e-
procurement project at a UK public organization,
we have developed a project evaluation model for
analyzing escalation and de-escalation using the
theories of approach-avoidance conﬂict and punc-
tuated equilibrium. The model depicts instances of
approach-avoidance conﬂict over the course of
project development. Through interviews with rel-
evant stakeholders and the review of important
documents, we have gathered data on attributes
that encourage and discourage persistence, and
that determine the trajectory of the project. These
instances of approach-avoidance conﬂict provide a
clear explanation of how and why escalation and
de-escalation could take place as they did in the
project at UKC. Our model also distinguishes
interacting courses of activities at separate levels
(project and work), and suggests that their neces-
sary intersections can have important bearings
on project trajectory.
While the case study approach adopted here
may have several strengths, a main limitation in
this study concerns the generalizability of a single
case study. Herriott and Firestone (1983) suggest
the preference of a multiple case-study design over
a single case-study design for obtaining more com-
pelling and robust data. However, in our view,
project failure is a sensitive subject and it may be
diﬃcult to obtain the opportunity of a multiple
case-study design. Therefore, we posit, ‘‘one must
follow a more opportunistic approach even if that
means settling for a single case study’’ Keil (1995,
p. 447). Besides, a single case is also useful in the-
ory building (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Despite its limitation, we believe the study is very
useful and has made several contributions: First, it
provides a detailed illustration of how an IS project
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can be trapped in cycles of escalation before it is
eventually turned around. Such turnaround experi-
ence is valuable since there are very few de-escala-
tion studies available in the IS development
literature (Montealegre and Keil, 2000). Second,
by using theUKC case as the basis, we have demon-
strated how the approach-avoidance perspective
could bring several escalation theories (e.g., self-jus-
tiﬁcation, prospect, etc.) together to be combined
into an overarching model. Until now, the ap-
proach-avoidance theory has been adopted only
in ﬁeld studies to investigate the escalation phenom-
enon in IS settings (Keil et al., 2000). This study rep-
resents one of the ﬁrst in-depth case studies to use
the theory to explore both the escalation and de-
escalation phenomena within an IS project in a dy-
namic organizational setting. Third, our model
shows that a dual-level process perspective of pro-
ject development could provide a greater explana-
tory power of how projects escalate and de-
escalate. We acknowledge that the dual-level con-
cept is still at an exploratory stage, but it may poten-
tially emerge as a useful extension to one of the
authors earlier work that focused on user–analyst
interaction episodes (Newman and Robey, 1992;
Newman and Sabherwal, 1996) as critical incidents
to explain process outcomes. Fourth, in this paper
we argue that since project evaluation is a complex,
human centered activity that cannot be divorced
from its organization context (Pettigrew, 1987,
1990; Serafeimidis and Smithson, 2003), practitio-
ners can therefore utilize the model in evaluating
projects that have faced escalation to diagnose the
issues surrounding escalation and devise useful
de-escalation strategies for future project develop-
ment. Finally, we believe our punctuated equilib-
rium evaluation model complements the existing
stage-based models (Staw and Ross, 1987;
Montealegre andKeil, 2000) in providing an under-
standing and explanation of the escalation and de-
escalation processes. Our model accounts for the
revolutionary periods of rapid change that may be
embedded, in gradual incremental processes, thus
providing an accurate reﬂection of todays uncer-
tain and rapidly changing project environments.
To establish the validity of the project evalua-
tion model proposed in this study, future research
could apply the model in other project escalation
and de-escalation contexts. As the existing ap-
proach-avoidance literature has generally consid-
ered only desist as the single driver promoting
avoidance, further research could explore other
drivers. We posit that ambiguity about a projects
future could be a possible strong candidate since
one could argue that a risk-averse decision maker
may pull the plug on a project whose future is
highly ambiguous. It is hoped that by identifying
additional avoidance drivers, a more balanced
assessment of approach-avoidance conﬂicts may
be arrived at. More longitudinal ﬁeld studies on
project turnarounds—especially those that involve
in-depth case studies—are clearly called for, so that
we may have a deeper understanding of the
dynamics of the phenomena of project commit-
ment escalation and de-escalation in various con-
texts. Furthermore, while Montealegre and Keils
(2000) four-phase de-escalation model ﬁts well with
large-scaled IS project context, the proposed model
in this paper may oﬀer itself as an alternative
explanatory model for analyzing the de-escalation
process in other types (medium-to-small) of IS pro-
jects. What the model oﬀers for now is an example
of a middle range theory (Wallace andWolf, 1999)
that may need to be modiﬁed in the light of further
case studies. This is an important issue especially in
todays multi-dimensional and complex project
environments as one may have to recognize the
importance of contextual diﬀerences in determin-
ing the appropriateness of a particular model.
Finally, an eﬀective, feedback improvement-ori-
ented review would be helpful for gaining top
management support for evaluations, thereby
increasing the possibility of more substantive and
meaningful evaluations being performed. Besides,
such process analyses could also be carried in rel-
atively low cost in project reviews to understand
how and why the dynamics of the process unfolded
as they did. The model could oﬀer a vocabulary to
frame experiences and to learn from the situations
in terms of how a project group behaves and how
causes and eﬀects are related. Unless the above
recommendation is achieved, project evaluation
will continue to serve the limited purpose of a cer-
emonial ritual in organizations.
S.L. Pan et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 173 (2006) 1139–1160 1157
Appendix A
Stakeholders in the IS development process
Roles Interviewed in Transcript
Cabinet Deputy of Co-ordination
Services (E-Envoy)
30 July 2002 (1 hour) #UKC-20
IS Strategic Director 15 December 2001 (1 hour)
—Negotiated Access
#UKC-1
15 January 2002 (1.5 hour) #UKC-2
29 July 2002 (1.5 hour) #UKC-19
Chief Procurement Oﬃcer 2 March 2002 (1 hour) #UKC-7
28 July 2002 (1.5 hour) #UKC-18
IS Project Manager 20 January 2002 (1.5 hour) #UKC-3
4 July 2002 (1.5 hour) #UKC-13
Corporate Service Manager 15 March 2002 (1 hour) #UKC-8
4 August 2002 (1 hour) #UKC-22
IS Programmer 25 February 2002 (1.5 hour) #UKC-5
14 July 2002 (1.5 h) #UKC-15
Technical Service Clerk 2 August 2002 (1.5 hour) #UKC-21
Technical Service Manager 25 February 2002 (1 hour) #UKC-6
14 July 2002 (1 hour) #UKC-16
IS Contractor—Sales Executive 8 August 2002 (1 hour) Rough Note-1
E-business Manager 12 May 2002 (1 hour) #UKC-10
IS analyst 7 February 2002 (1.5 hour),
29 June 2002 (1.5 hour)
#UKC-4 #UKC-12
E-business Clerk 18 May 2002 (1 hour) #UKC-11
Head of Corporate Aﬀairs 2 April 2002 (1.5 hour) Rough Note-2
8 July 2002 (1 hour)
Corporate Service Clerk 27 July 2002 (1 hour) #UKC-17
Purchasing Oﬃcer 25 March 2002 (1 hour) #UKC-9
8 July 2002 (1 hour) #UKC-14
Corporate Aﬀairs Clerk 2 April 2002 (1 hour) Rough Note-3
16 August 2002 (1 hour)
IS Contractor—Senior Manager 27 July 2002 (1 hour) Rough Note-4
Role of the E-Envoy
Responsibilities • Delivering the existing Cabinet Oﬃce target for electronic
service delivery
(electronic government agenda)
• Deﬁning and driving implementation of a Government-wide
information
systems strategy to support the public sector reform agenda
• Providing leadership and guidance for the electronic government
initiatives
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